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Abstract. We study insolvency cascades in an interbank system when
banks are allowed to insure their loans with credit default swaps (CDS)
sold by other banks. We show that, by properly shifting financial expo-
sures from one institution to another, a CDS market can be designed
to rewire the network of interbank exposures in a way that makes it
more resilient to insolvency cascades. A regulator can use information
about the topology of the interbank network to devise a systemic in-
surance surcharge that is added to the CDS spread. CDS contracts are
thus effectively penalized according to how much they contribute to in-
creasing systemic risk. CDS contracts that decrease systemic risk remain
untaxed. We simulate this regulated CDS market using an agent-based
model (CRISIS macro-financial model) and we demonstrate that it leads
to an interbank system that is more resilient to insolvency cascades.
Keywords: Systemic Risk, Credit Default Swaps, DebtRank, Agent-Based Mod-
els, Multiplex Networks, Interbank Systems
1 Introduction
Financial derivative contracts have been criticized for their role in the 2007-
2008 financial crisis. The opacity of such contracts – and the fact that they
are often unregulated or traded over-the-counter (OTC) – has drawn criticism,
in particular to credit default swaps (CDSs)1. CDSs were created in the 1990s
as a risk management tool by which a loan could be insured against default
risk. Their use is however mostly speculative and has drastically increased since
the early 2000s. By 2007, the size of this market (in terms of outstanding CDS
amount) was $62.2 trillion and, although it decreased after the financial crisis of
2007-2008, it remained considerable at about $25.5 trillion in 2012.
In a financial system, institutions are interconnected through a complex net-
work of exposures. This complex web of financial exposures creates systemic
risk: the insolvency of a particular institution and the resulting default on its
1 See for example: ”ISDA: CDS Marketplace :: Market Statistics”. Isdacdsmarket-
place.com. December 31, 2010. Accessed on September 4, 2015.
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loans can precipitate other institutions into insolvency, thereby generating an
insolvency cascade. Studying financial systems from a network perspective has
thus received a lot of attention in recent years. It is now known that different
financial network topologies have different impacts on the probability of sys-
temic collapse [9, 12, 4, 3, 18]. In this sense managing systemic risk reduces to
the technical problem of re-shaping the topology of financial networks. Properly
used, CDSs have the effect of transferring a financial exposure from one institu-
tion to another. They can thus be used to change the topology of the financial
network of interbank exposures. To understand whether CDSs can be efficiently
used for risk management, it is thus essential to study the impact they have on
the topology of financial networks.
In this article, we describe how a regulator can use CDSs to restructure the
interbank network. Banks are exposed to each other through interbank loans
resulting from the conduct of normal banking operations. To guard against the
risk of default of a counter-party on a given loan, a bank can buy a CDS contract
from another bank. A regulator can then use information about the topology of
the interbank system to impose a systemic insurance ‘surcharge’ that is added to
the CDS spread. This surcharge is proportional to the amount of systemic risk
created by the contract. This effectively constitutes a mechanism that ’taxes’
CDS contracts according to how they contribute to increasing systemic risk.
CDS contracts that decrease systemic risk – by reallocating exposures more
efficiently – remain untaxed. This mechanism has the effect of ‘matching’ CDS
counter-parties in a way that reduces systemic risk. With an agent-based model
(CRISIS macro-financial model), we demonstrate how this mechanism leads to a
self-organized re-structuring of the interbank system that makes it considerably
more resilient to insolvency cascades.
One of our contributions is to study the financial system as a multi-layer
network. Here the different layers represent different types of contractual obliga-
tions (loans, derivatives). We show that insolvency cascades can spread through
these different types of edges in non-standard ways. This complements recent
treatments of systemic risk in multilayered networks (e.g. [6, 5, 16]). Our main
contribution is however to propose a mechanism to regulate the CDS market
so as to control the formation of the interbank network (modeled as a multi-
layer network). The existing literature, on the other hand, is fairly young and
has mainly focused on the introduction of a central clearing house for derivatives
(and the associated effects of bilateral netting) or on setting collateral levels (e.g.
[8]). The only other similar mechanisms proposed were in [17, 18, 15]. We also
show that an unregulated CDS market, in which banks are allowed to speculate
by buying CDS on loans that they do not own, can drastically increase systemic
risk by creating many contagion channels.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present a multi-layer model
of the interbank system, which allows us to study how CDSs affect the topology
of exposures between the banks. In Section 3, we introduce a measure of systemic
risk that allows us to characterize how a particular CDS contract increases or
decreases systemic risk. We then discuss how a regulator can design a systemic
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surcharge mechanism for CDS contracts, which effectively rewires the interbank
system. In Section 4, we simulate this mechanism using an agent-based model
(CRISIS macro-financial model) and show that it can considerably improve the
resilience of the interbank system to insolvency cascades.
2 A Multi-Layer Network Model for the Interbank
System
2.1 Network of Loan Exposures
Let us consider a financial system composed of B banks. Based on their liquidity
needs, these banks extend loans to each other. Assume that there can be more
than one loan between banks i and j. Let L˜ij =
∑
k l
k
ij , where l
k
ij > 0 is the value
of the k-th loan extended by j to i. We let lkij = −lkji so that L˜ij > 0 means j
has a positive net exposure to i. This quantity then allows us to define the net
exposure matrix as
L = max(0, L˜). (1)
A positive entry Lij > 0 represents the net exposure of j to i while Lij = 0
means that j is not exposed to i. The net exposure matrix L defines a network
of net exposures, as represented in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Network of interbank loan exposures. Here B = 7 and the interbank system
is thus composed of 7 banks. Each edge represents the net loan exposure between two
banks.
Loans carry credit risk: in the event of bank i’s default, bank j may not
be able to recover the net amount Lij that it has lent to bank i. The network
of loan exposures L creates systemic risk. Indeed, the impact of the default of
some borrower i not only affects the lender j itself, but potentially the lenders’
creditors as well as their own creditors and so on. In the example of Fig. 1, the
insolvency of bank 4 not only affects bank 5, but may also propagate to banks
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6 and 7, thus generating an insolvency cascade. Likewise, the lender is not only
vulnerable to the defaults of his own borrowers, but also to the defaults of his
borrowers’ borrowers and so on. In an interbank network, credit risk thus ceases
to be a local property and becomes systemic. Such insolvency cascades have
been extensively studied, e.g. [9, 12, 17, 1, 3, 10, 2]. The size of an insolvency
cascade is shown to depend on the topology of the exposures network. Systemic
risk must thus be understood as a network property.
In order to guard against the risk of default of a borrower, a lending bank
can insure its loan using a financial instrument known as a credit default swap
(CDS).
2.2 Basics of Credit Default Swaps (CDSs)
A credit default swap (CDS) is a financial swap agreement, in which the buyer
makes a series of periodic payments (known as ‘spread’ payments) in exchange
for a promise that the seller will compensate the buyer in the event of default
on some specific reference loan (or bond). If the CDS buyer holds the reference
loan, it is thus a form of insurance contract. In the event of default on that
reference loan, the buyer of the CDS typically receives an amount equal to the
par value of the loan from the CDS seller. This is illustrated in Fig. 2, where a
bank i buys CDS protection from bank j on some reference loan lkmn extended
to bank m.
If, in the CDS contract of Fig. 2, the buyer (bank i) also owns the reference
loan lkmi, then the CDS is used as insurance against the default of m. We will
refer to such a contract as a ‘covered’ CDS. In reality, the buyer of the CDS
need not own the reference loan lkmn. The latter will then be referred to as a
‘naked’ CDS and can allow the parties to speculate on the credit worthiness of
the reference entity (bank m).
2.3 Effect of CDSs on the Interbank Network Topology
CDS Exposures Let C¯
lkmn
ij > 0 denote the promised payment of the CDS
contract sold by bank j to bank i in the event of default of the reference entity
m on the reference loan lkmn. We can now define C˜
m
ij =
∑
k,n C¯
lkmn
ij as the total
promised payments on CDS contracts sold by bank j to bank i in the event of
default of m. We let C˜mij = −C˜mji so that C˜mij > 0 means j has a positive net
CDS exposure to i. This quantity then allows us to define the net CDS exposure
matrix on the reference entity m:
Cm = max(0, C˜m). (2)
A positive entry Cmij > 0 represents the net CDS exposure of j to i on the
reference entity m. In the event of m’s default, j will thus have to pay this
amount to i. Cmij = 0 means that j has no CDS exposure to i on the reference
entity m.
Systemic Risk Management in Financial Networks with CDSs 5
(a)
(b)
Fig. 2. A typical CDS contract between buyer i and seller j on some reference loan lkmn.
(a) Transactions when there is no default of the reference entity m. (b) Transactions
in the event of default of the reference entity m.
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A Two-Layer Representation for the Interbank Network Note that the
collection of all CDS exposure matrices {Cm}m=1,...,B defines a multiplex net-
work, i.e. a network where different types of edges may exist between different
banks. Each particular type of edge represents a net CDS exposure on a partic-
ular reference entity m. The edge type is thus labeled by m.
The interbank system can thus be represented as a two-layer network: The
first layer represents the network of loan exposures L between the B banks, while
the second layer represents the multiplex network of CDS exposures between
the B banks. Such a two-layer representation is similar to that used in [16]. It is
represented in Fig. 3. From that figure, we see that a directed edge ij of weight
Fig. 3. A two-layer network representing the interbank system. Here B = 7 and the
interbank system is thus composed of 7 banks. Layer 1 represents net loan exposures
between those banks. Layer 2 represents net CDS exposures on various reference entities
(banks).
Lij on layer 1 represents the net loan exposure of bank j to bank i. On the other
hand, a directed edge ij of weight Cmij represents the net amount that bank j
will have to pay bank i in the event of the default of bank m.
Note that the relations between the different layers are highly non-standard.
The default of a particular bank will not only affect its creditors, but also the
banks that have sold CDS contracts on that reference bank. It may therefore be
difficult to measure the impact of the bankruptcy of one bank on the system as
it depends on the interaction between the layers. Fortunately, this multi-layer
network can be conveniently mapped to a single-layer network, representing the
effective net exposures2 of banks to one another. This effective net exposure is
2 Note that we allow here the netting of different asset classes. As a matter of fact
there are detailed international agreements on the netting procedure in the case of
failure of a counterparty. Typically, for deposits and loans it is customary to calculate
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defined, for any banks i and j, as
Leffij = max
(
0, Lij −
∑
z
Cijz +
∑
z′
Ci
z′ j
)
. (3)
This mapping of the two layers into a single exposure layer is illustrated in
Fig. 4 and Fig. 5.
Fig. 4. Effective Exposure with a ‘Covered’ CDS: the Topology of the Loans Exposure
Network is ’Rewired’. In this simple example, there are 4 banks (B = 4) and only one
CDS exposure on reference entity 2. Since the buyer of the CDS C213 (bank 1) also owns
the loan l21, the CDS contracts transfers this loan exposure to the seller of the CDS
(bank 3).
In Fig. 4, we see that ‘covered’ CDS contracts have the effect of rewiring the
network of loan exposures by transferring exposures from one bank to another. In
this simple example, there are 4 banks and only one CDS exposure on reference
entity (bank) 2. Thus bank 1 has bought a CDS from bank 3 on the reference
bank 2. The value of the CDS exposure here is l21 so that bank 1 has insured
its net loan exposure to bank 2 against the possible default of bank 2. This loan
exposure l21 is thus effectively transferred to 3.
It is important to note that in Fig. 4, the buyer of the CDS (bank 1) also
owns the reference loan l21. In Fig. 5, we show the effect of a ‘naked’ CDS on the
network of effective exposures. In this case, bank 1 buys a CDS on a loan that
it does not own (i.e. l34). The effect is the creation of a new edge in the network
of effective exposures. Thus instead of rewiring the network, a naked CDS has
the potential to create new contagion channels.
the gross exposure instead of the net exposure and derivatives can only be netted
by each type of derivative contract.
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Fig. 5. Effective Exposure with a ‘Naked’ CDS: an Additional Exposure (Edge) is
Created. In this simple example, there are 4 banks (B = 4) and only one CDS exposure
on reference entity 3. Since the buyer of the CDS C312 (bank 1) does not own the loan
l34, the CDS contract creates a new exposure: the seller of the CDS (bank 2) is now
exposed to the reference entity (bank 3).
3 A Regulated CDS Market
3.1 Effect of CDSs on Systemic Risk
As a network property, systemic risk can be quantified by network metrics. One
such metric is DebtRank [3, 18, 17], which is a recursive method to determine the
systemic relevance of nodes within a financial network. DebtRank has a natural
interpretation as the fraction of the total economic value in the financial network
that is potentially lost as a result of the default (or distress) of a bank (or a set
of banks). Considering the network of effective exposures Leff and the capital
E = [E1, ..., EB ] of all banks, the DebtRank Ri(L
eff , E) of bank i can be readily
computed (see [3] for details).
We study an environment in which CDS contracts are guaranteed by some
well-capitalized regulating agency. If bank i defaults and cannot honor its obli-
gations, then bank j may lose the value Lij of its net loan exposure to bank
i. However if some bank z has a CDS exposure Cijz to bank j on the reference
bank i, then it will pay bank j an amount to compensate the loss. If bank z
is unable to fully pay this amount because its exceeds its capital, then bank z
will go bankrupt. The regulating agency will however step in to guarantee the
CDS payment to bank j. The effective net exposure Leff is thus the appropriate
quantity to measure the exposure of one institution to another. The assumption
that there is a well-capitalized regulating agency guaranteeing CDS contracts
has already been made in the literature. For example, see [8, 6] for papers that
study the central clearing of derivative contracts.
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We can now naturally define the expected systemic loss as
ELsyst(Leff , E) =
B∑
i=1
P defi V Ri(L
eff , E) (4)
where P defi is the exogenous probability of default of bank i and V is the com-
bined economic value of all banks. Ri(L
eff , E) is the DebtRank of bank i, as
introduced earlier. By exogenous probability of default, we mean that P defi is
the probability that bank i fails due to factors other than the default of other
banks to which it is exposed. This allows us to separate exogenous (or non net-
work) effects from contagion (or network) effects.
To calculate the contribution of a particular CDS contract C¯
lkmn
ij to the ex-
pected systemic loss, we need to adjust layer m by updating the matrix C˜m as
follows
C˜m
′
ij = C˜
m
ij + C¯
lkmn
ij (5)
and
C˜m
′
ji = C˜
m
ji − C¯l
k
mn
ij (6)
and then recalculating Leff by using equations (2)-(3). We denote the effective
net exposure matrix in the presence of that specific CDS contract by Leff[+C¯
lkmn
ij ].
It is now straightforward to compute the marginal effect of that particular
CDS contract on the expected systemic loss:
∆[+C¯
lkmn
ij ]ELsyst = ELsyst(Leff[+C¯
lkmn
ij ], E[+C¯
lkmn
ij ])− ELsyst(Leff , E) (7)
=
B∑
i=1
P defi
(
V [+C¯
lkmn
ij ] ·Ri(Leff[+C¯
lkmn
ij ], E[+C¯
lkmn
ij ])− V ·Ri(Leff , E)
)
where E[+C¯
lkmn
ij ] is the vector of the banks’ equities in the presence of the CDS
contract C¯
lkmn
ij . Likewise, V
[+C¯
lkmn
ij ] is the combined economic value of all banks
in the presence of the CDS contract C¯
lkmn
ij .
Note that ∆[+C¯
lkmn
ij ]ELsyst may be either positive or negative. Indeed, a CDS
contract may decrease systemic risk if it shifts a loan exposure from a bank with
higher DebtRank to a bank with lower DebtRank. The default of the debtor
bank then has a smaller impact on the system. In such a case, ∆[+C¯
lkmn
ij ]ELsyst
will be negative.
3.2 Using CDSs to Rewire the Interbank Network
The spread that a buyer i of a CDS contract must pay to a seller j on the
reference loan lkmn is a function of the reference entity m’s probability of default.
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We denote it by sm to emphasize the dependence on m. Since a CDS contract
promises a payment equal to the face value of the loan, the total payment will
thus be sm · lkmn.
The case for a well-capitalized regulating agency to guarantee the fulfillment
of derivative contracts has already been studied in the context of central clearing
(e.g. [8], [6]). Here we employ a different approach: a well-capitalized agency
regulates the CDS market by incentivizing the CDS contracts that decrease
systemic risk and penalizing those that increase it. It can do so by adding a
systemic insurance surcharge to the spread that is normally paid on such a
contract. Since a regulator with knowledge of the network topology can compute
the marginal effect of a CDS contract on systemic risk, she can devise a surcharge
that will be applied to those CDS contracts that increase systemic risk. This
systemic surcharge can be defined as
τij(l
k
mn) = ζ ·max
[
0,
∫ T
0
v(t) ·∆[+C¯
lkmn
ij ]ELsyst(t) dt
]
(8)
where
∆[+C¯
lkmn
ij ]ELsyst(t) =
∑
i
pˆi(t)
(
V [+C¯
lkmn
ij ]·Ri(Leff[+C
lkmn
ij ], E[+C
lkmn
ij ])−V ·Ri(Leff , E)
)
Here ζ > 0 is some chosen scaling parameter, v(t) is a discount factor and
pˆi(t) is the density function for the exogenous default probability. T is the CDS
contract’s maturity.
The spread that bank i must pay for a CDS contract sold by bank j on a
loan lkmn now depends not only on the reference entity m, but also on the two
parties i and j in the CDS contract, i.e.
sij(l
k
mn) = sm + τij(l
k
mn). (9)
The effect of that systemic surcharge will be that a buyer i of CDS protection
will now choose the seller j with the smallest effective spread sij(l
k
mn) and thus
the contract that contributes the least to increasing systemic risk. Without that
systemic surcharge, the buyer would pay the same spread sm to any seller and
thus would be indifferent to which seller it buys from. Indeed, the spread of
a CDS depends solely on the reference entity’s probability of default, not on
the CDS seller. While the normal spread sm is collected by the CDS seller, the
systemic surcharge τij is collected by the regulating agency and placed in a fund
that will be used to guarantee the fulfillment of CDS contracts if the seller were
to become insolvent.
4 Simulation Results and Discussion
4.1 The Agent-Based Model
We simulate this regulated CDS market using an agent-based model (CRISIS
macro-financial model). This is an economic simulator that combines a well-
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studied macroeconomic ABM [17, 7, 13, 11] with an ABM of the interbank
system. We use a modified version of the ABM in [13], which we augmented with
a multi-layer interbank market. We also follow the same simulation procedure
as in [17], but with the addition of the CDS market. In [17], only a loans market
was considered. This is a closed economic system, i.e. it does not allow for cash
in-flows or out-flows. For a full description of this agent-based model, the reader
is referred to [13, 14].
The model features three types of agents: households, banks, and firms, as
depicted in Fig. 6. They interact on five markets
(i) Firms and banks interact on the credit market.
(ii) Banks interact with banks on the interbank market for loans.
(iii) Banks interact with banks on the interbank market for CDSs.
(iv) Households and firms interact on the job market.
(v) Households and firms interact on the consumption goods market.
Banks
Firms
Households
loans
deposits
consumption
deposits
wages / dividends
Fig. 6. Schematic Overview of the Structure of the Agent-Based Model (ABM). The
three agent types (banks, firms, and households) and their interactions are shown. Firms
pay dividends to their owners, and wages (financed through income and loans) to their
workers. Households consume goods produced by the firms. Households and firms deposit
money in banks, banks grant loans to the firms. Most importantly, banks extend inter-
bank loans to each other and they can insure them with CDSs issued by other banks.
Households There are H households, which come in two types: firm owners
and workers. Each of them has a personal account Aj,b(t) at one of the B banks.
j indexes the worker, b the bank. Household accounts are randomly assigned to
banks. Workers apply for jobs at the F different firms. If hired, they receive a
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fixed income w per time step, and supply a fixed labor productivity α. Firm
owners receive their income through dividends from their firm’s profits. At every
time step, each household spends a fixed percentage c of its current account on
the goods market. They compare prices of goods from z randomly chosen firms
and buy the cheapest.
Firms There are F firms producing perfectly substitutable goods. At every
time step, firms compute an expected demand di(t), and an estimated price
pi(t) (subscript labels the firm), based on a rule that takes into account both
excess demand/supply and the deviation of the price pi(t− 1) from the average
price in the previous time step [13]. Each firm computes the number of required
workers to supply the expected demand. If the wages for the respective work-
force exceed the firm’s current liquidity, it applies for credit. Firms approach n
randomly chosen banks and choose the credit with the most favorable rate. If
this rate exceeds a threshold rate rmax, the firm only asks for φ percent of the
originally desired loan volume. Based on the outcome of this credit request, firms
re-evaluate the needed workforce, and hire or fire the needed number of workers.
Firms sell the goods on the consumption goods market. Firms go bankrupt if they
have negative liquidity after the goods market closes. Each of the bankrupted
firm’s debtors (banks) incurs a capital loss in proportion to their investment
in the company. Firm owners of bankrupted firms are personally liable, their
account is divided by the debtors pro rata. They immediately start a new com-
pany, with initially zero equity. Their initial estimates for di(t) and pi(t) equal
the respective current averages in the population.
Banks There are B banks that offer firm loans at rates that take into account
the individual specificity of banks (modeled by a uniformly distributed random
variable), and the firms’ creditworthiness. Firms pay a credit risk premium ac-
cording to their creditworthiness that is modeled by a monotonically increasing
function of their financial fragility [13]. Banks try to provide requested firm loans
and grant them if they have enough liquid resources. If they do not have enough
cash, they approach other banks in the interbank market to obtain the needed
amount. If a bank does not have enough cash and cannot raise the full amount
for the requested firm loan on the IB market it does not pay out the loan. In-
terbank and firms loans have the same duration. Additional refinancing costs of
banks remain with the firms.
At each time step, firms and banks re-pay a fixed percentage of their out-
standing debt (principal plus interest). If banks have excess-liquidity they offer
it on the interbank market for a nominal interest rate. The interbank relation
network is modeled as a fully connected network and banks choose the interbank
offers with the most favorable rate. Interbank rates rij offered by bank i to bank
j take into account the specificity of bank i, and the creditworthiness of bank j.
Every time a new loan has been extended from one bank to another, the
lending bank can insure its loan on the interbank market for CDSs. It can do
so by asking another bank (other than the one it just lent money to) to act as
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counter-party in a CDS contract. Any other bank will demand the same spread
sj for offering protection on an underlying loan extended bank j. This spread
reflects the creditworthiness of bank j. In an unregulated CDS market, a bank
i will thus be indifferent as to which other bank m it buys a CDS from. In a
regulated CDS market, on the other hand, a bank will try to buy a CDS from
the bank m associated with the lowest effective spread sim (cf. Section 3.2).
If a bank goes bankrupt, the respective creditor bank writes off the respective
outstanding loans as defaulted credits. It then receives the promised compensa-
tion payment from the bank that issued CDS protection on the defaulted bank.
If the issuing bank has not enough equity capital to cover these CDS payments,
it defaults. The CDS payments are however guaranteed by the regulating agency,
which will step in to cover whatever portion of the CDS payment the issuing
bank is not able to make.
Following a bank default, an iterative default-event unfolds for all interbank
creditors and all issuers of CDSs. This may trigger a cascade of bank defaults. For
simplicity, we assume no recovery for interbank loans. This assumption is rea-
sonable in practice for short-term liquidity. A cascade of bankruptcies happens
within one time step. After the last bankruptcy is taken care of the simulation
is stopped.
4.2 Implementation of the Systemic Surcharge
The systemic surcharge that is added to all CDS transactions is implemented
as follows. The surcharge is calculated according to Eq. (8). Before entering a
CDS transaction, a bank i can get quotes of the effective spreads for various
counter-parties from the regulating agency. Bank i chooses to buy a CDS from
the bank m with the smallest effective spread sim. Banks thus have an incentive
to enter into CDS transactions that either have the effect of reducing systemic
risk or have the smallest possible effect on increasing it. In the latter case, the
regulating agency collects the surcharge τim, which it stores in a fund. This fund
may then be used to guarantee the fulfillment of CDS contracts in the event of
the bankruptcy of the CDS seller.
4.3 Results
We implement the agent-based model described above for B = 20 banks, F =
100 firms and H = 1300 households.
For purposes of comparison, we study four different scenarios: (i) An inter-
bank loans market without CDSs; (ii) an interbank loans market without CDSs
but regulated with a Tobin tax on all loan transactions; (iii) an interbank loans
market with unregulated, naked CDSs; (iv) An interbank loans market with cov-
ered CDSs regulated as previously described.
Results are averaged over 10, 000 independent, identical simulation runs across
500 time steps. We set P defi = 0.01, and ζ = 0.02. In the case of Tobin tax we
impose a constant tax rate of 0.2% of the transaction on all interbank rates on
offer.
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Fig. 7. Network of Effective Exposures under Different Scenarios. The case of an in-
terbank system composed of 20 banks without a CDS market (loans only) is shown in
(a). The case of this interbank system without a CDS market (loans only), but with
loans penalized by a Tobin tax is shown in (b). The case of this interbank system with
an unregulated, naked CDS market is shown in (c), while the case with a regulated CDS
market, where systemic risk is managed using the systemic surcharge is shown in (d).
The systemic importance Ri of a bank is measured by its DebtRank and color coded.
The contribution of an exposure (edge) to systemic risk is also color coded.
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In Fig. 7, we plot the networks representing the effective exposures between
banks in the four scenarios described above. In Fig. 7 (a), we see the interbank
network without a CDS market. The exposures are thus just loan exposures.
We notice that many banks have high systemic importance, due to the absence
of incentives to form a network with low systemic risk. Systemic importance is
measured by a bank’s DebtRank Ri, which is color coded. In Fig. 7 (b), we see
that a Tobin transaction tax fails to decrease the systemic importance of banks.
Indeed, loans are all taxed equally, which has no effect on controlling the network
structure. In Fig. 7 (d), on the other hand we see that a regulated CDS market,
where systemic risk is managed according to the surcharge mechanism described
earlier, allows for a self-organized restructuring of the interbank system in which
each bank has considerably lesser systemic importance. In Fig. 7 (c), however,
we see that an unregulated CDS market allowing for speculation (naked CDSs)
considerably increases the systemic importance of the banks and also the density
of the network (i.e. it creates more contagion channels).
In Fig. 8 (a), we plot the aggregate losses to the interbank system resulting
from insolvency cascades. These are shown to be considerably decreased when the
CDS market is regulated as described previously (shown in green). On the other
hand, the situation becomes much worse when the CDS market is unregulated
(shown in red) and banks are allowed to speculate by buying ‘naked’ CDSs, i.e.
CDSs that are not used as insurance on an underlying loan. We see that the
loss distribution is actually bimodal, i.e. there is a strong probability of very
high loss, associated with total systemic collapse. Fig. 8 (b) shows the number
of banks that fail in a cascades. The patterns are similar as those discussed
for (a) above. Fig. 8 (c) shows the corresponding DebtRanks (i.e. the systemic
importance) of the 20 banks in each of the three different scenarios. We can
clearly see that by increasing the number of contagion channels, an unregulated
CDS market considerably increases the systemic riskiness of each bank. On the
other hand, by properly transferring exposures from one bank to another, the
proposed systemic surcharge mechanism for CDSs creates an interbank system
in which each institution is considerably less systemically risky.
In Fig. 9, we provide additional network statistics. In Fig. 9(a), we show the
empirical in-degree distribution of the effective exposure network. We can see
that a regulated CDS market somewhat shifts the in-degree distribution towards
lower degrees. An unregulated CDS market, on the other hand, appears to shift it
towards higher degrees and this was to be expected from Fig. 7(c), where we saw
that many more exposures (edges) were created in the network. The in-degree,
however does not give the full picture. Indeed, in the effective exposure network,
it is rather the presence of cycles that can increase the potential size of insolvency
cascades by creating long chains of exposures. Since a CDS market regulated with
a systemic insurance surcharge was shown to decrease systemic risk, we may
expect it to have the effect of cutting cycles of exposures. A statistic that can
be used to assess the presence of cycles is the clustering coefficient. In Fig. 9(b),
we see that a regulated CDS market indeed decreases the clustering coefficient.
This is achieved in part by encouraging CDS transactions that ’cancel’ existing
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Fig. 8. Systemic Risk in 3 Different Scenarios. The case of an interbank system com-
posed of 20 banks without a CDS market is shown in blue. The case of this interbank
system with a regulated CDS market is shown in green while the case of this interbank
system with an unregulated CDS market is shown in red. Plot (a) shows the histogram
of aggregated losses resulting from insolvency cascades in each scenario. Plot (b) shows
the histogram of the number of banks that fail in a cascade in each scenario. Plot (c)
shows the DebtRanks (i.e. the systemic importance) of the 20 banks in each scenario.
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exposures, thus decreasing net exposures. An unregulated CDS market, on the
other hand, has the effect of increasing the clustering coefficient by creating more
exposures and thus more cycles in the effective exposure network.
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Fig. 9. Network Statistics in 3 Different Scenarios. The case of an interbank system
composed of 20 banks without a CDS market is shown in blue. The case of this interbank
system with a regulated CDS market is shown in green while the case of this interbank
system with an unregulated CDS market is shown in red. Plot (a) shows the empirical
in-degree distribution. Plot (b) shows the empirical distribution of clustering coefficient.
5 Conclusion
In this article, we showed that credit default swaps (CDSs) offer a natural way
to restructure financial networks, as they can be used to shift loan exposures
from one institution to another. When properly regulated, they can lead to net-
work configurations that are more resilient to insolvency cascades. We proposed
a taxing mechanism that incentivizes institutions to form CDS contracts that
decrease systemic risk by reallocating loan exposures in a more efficient way. A
regulator in possession of network information can impose a systemic surcharge
to the CDS spread. This surcharge penalizes CDS contracts that increase sys-
temic risk, but leaves other CDS contracts unaffected. This systemic surcharge
is collected by the regulator and can be used to guarantee the fulfillment of CDS
contracts in the event that the seller were to become insolvent.
We also showed that an unregulated CDS market leads to an interbank sys-
tem with network properties that are totally different from those of a loans
market without derivatives. Unregulated, these credit derivatives can be indeed
extremely dangerous as they create additional contagion channels.
This work stresses the importance of developing regulations that influence
the topology of financial networks. Existing regulation such as Tobin taxes or
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capital requirements do not affect the structure of financial networks and thus
have limited effect on increasing their resilience to insolvency cascades.
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